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Ian J. Deary
University of Edinburgh
There is evidence that having a stronger sense of positive well-being may be a potential resource for
healthier aging as represented by slower physical decline, reduced risk of frailty and longer survival.
However, it is unclear whether positive well-being is protective of another crucial component of healthy
aging, cognitive function, or whether it has a bidirectional relationship with cognitive function. We use
multilevel models with within-person centering to estimate the within- and between-person association
between cognitive function and positive well-being in 4 waves of data from the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA), (N  10985, aged 50–90 years at wave 1). Our findings show that, although
most variation in cognitive function was explained by age, and most variation in well-being was
explained by depression, small but significant associations between cognition and well-being remained
after variation in age and depression were controlled. In models where cognition was the outcome, the
association was mainly because of variation in mean levels of well-being between persons. In models
where well-being was the outcome, the association was mainly because of within-person fluctuation in
cognitive test performance. Exercise and depression were the most important moderating influences on
the association between cognition and positive well-being. Depression had greater effect upon this
association for those with higher well-being, but exercise protected cognitive performance against the
adverse effects of lower well-being.
Keywords: positive well-being, cognitive function, multilevel model, within-person change
Maintaining positive psychological well-being in the face of the
changes and losses of later life is generally considered a crucial
part of “healthy” ageing (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Rowe & Kahn,
1997; Jeste, Depp, & Vahia, 2010). In recent years there has been
growing evidence to suggest that well-being may also be a poten-
tial resource for ageing well. Prospective studies have found that
older people with greater well-being are less likely to develop
problems with mobility or other activities of daily life (Collins,
Goldman, & Rodriguez, 2008; Ostir, Markides, Black, & Good-
win, 2000; Boyle, Buchman, & Bennett, 2010), or to become
physically frail (Gale, Cooper, Deary, & Aihie Sayer, 2014; Ostir,
Ottenbacher, & Markides, 2004). In a meta-analysis of 35 pro-
spective studies where greater positive well-being was linked with
a reduced risk of mortality both in healthy populations and those
already ill at baseline, the survival benefit associated with
greater well-being was particularly marked in people aged 60
and over (Chida & Steptoe, 2008). In all these studies the
protective effect of positive well-being persisted after adjust-
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ment for negative affect, and so was not due merely to the
absence of depression.
It is unclear whether positive well-being might be a protective
factor with regard to another crucial component of healthy ageing,
cognitive function (Fiocco & Yaffe, 2010; Rowe & Kahn, 1997;
Baltes & Baltes, 1990). Most early studies, largely carried out in
small, nonrepresentative samples, found no link between positive
well-being and cognition (Diener, 1984). More recent cross-
sectional analyses in several cohorts of older people have found
either small to moderate positive correlations (Isaacowitz & Smith,
2003; Gale, Cooper, et al. 2012) or no association (Gow et al.,
2005). Whether these significant cross-sectional associations re-
flect an effect of well-being on cognition or vice versa is uncertain.
Most prospective studies that have examined whether mental states
might influence subsequent cognitive function have focused on the
negative mental state of depression, and their findings have been
mixed (see review in Gale et al., 2012). Whereas it is likely that
depression may be accompanied by lower positive well-being, it is
increasingly recognized that positive well-being and negative men-
tal states are to some degree independent of each other (Diener &
Emmons, 1984; Huppert & Whittington, 2003), as suggested by
the findings that positive well-being is predictive of various health
outcomes after controlling for the presence of depression (Chida &
Steptoe, 2008; Ostir et al., 2000; Ostir et al., 2004; Collins et al.,
2008; Boyle, Buchman, Barnes, & Bennett, 2010). As yet, very
few prospective studies have examined whether higher positive
well-being might protect against cognitive decline. In one such
study of people aged 70 and over, greater positive well-being—
assessed using a measure based on items about life satisfaction and
satisfaction with ageing—was linked with slower decline in per-
ceptual speed (Gerstorf, Lovden, Rocke, Smith, & Lindenberger,
2007). There is some evidence linking a stronger sense of per-
ceived control—sometimes viewed as a facet of eudaimonic well-
being—with better performance on cognitive tests (Welch & West,
1995; West, Bagwell, & Dark-Freudeman, 2008). Longitudinal
evidence linking a stronger sense of perceived control with less
cognitive decline is inconsistent. In a study that examined within-
person changes in perceived control in relation to rates of change
in cognition, increases in control were only weakly and not sig-
nificantly linked to reduced rates of cognitive decline (Windsor &
Anstey, 2008). But older people with a stronger sense of perceived
control had fewer difficulties in performing cognitive tasks 20
years later (Caplan & Schooler, 2003). Having a stronger sense of
purpose in life—also viewed as a facet of eudaimonic well-being
(Ryff, 1989)—has been associated with a reduced risk of incident
Alzheimer’s disease and mild cognitive impairment (Boyle, Bu-
chman, Barnes, & Bennett, 2010).
Positive well-being might influence cognitive function in later
life through several mechanisms. There is considerable evidence
from experimental studies that induced states of positive well-
being improve performance on a range of cognitive tasks, possibly
because of raised dopamine levels (Isen, Rosenzweig, & Young,
1991; Ashby et al., 1999; Isen, 2008 and 2009). Higher levels of
positive well-being have been associated with reduced neuroendo-
crine activity, lower concentrations of inflammatory factors and
triglycerides, higher concentrations of high-density-lipoprotein
cholesterol, lower heart rate and blood pressure and less central
obesity (Steptoe, Wardle, & Marmot, 2005; Steptoe, Demakakos,
de Oliveira, & Wardle, 2012), and a reduction in risk of incident
coronary heart disease (Davidson, Mostofsky, & Whang, 2010).
All of these occurred independently of depressive symptoms.
Associations between positive well-being and cognitive decline
could potentially be moderated by these factors.
It is plausible that the relationship between positive well-being
and cognitive function is bidirectional. At older ages impaired
cognition may constrain the ability to manage usual activities of
daily life and hence cause decline in well-being. Longitudinal
evidence in support of this is limited. One study of people aged 70
and over found no evidence that increases in cognitive limitations,
as measured by the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), over
a 54-month period influenced the trajectory of positive well-being
(Kurland, Gill, Patrick, Larson, & Phelan, 2006). However, the
MMSE is a crude estimate of cognitive function, and has a marked
ceiling effect in nonclinical samples. In the Berlin Ageing Study
no association was found between decline in perceptual speed and
trajectory of well-being over a 13-year period (Gerstorf et al.,
2007), but perceptual speed is just one domain of cognitive func-
tioning. In a longitudinal study of people aged 78–98 where
participants took tests of executive function, processing speed,
episodic memory, sematic memory, spatial ability and working
memory, better performance on tests of processing speed and
spatial ability, but not on tests of other cognitive domains, were
significantly associated with slightly higher scores on a measure of
life satisfaction 3 years later after adjustment for potential con-
founding factors including depressive symptoms (Enkvist, Ek-
strom, & Elmstahl, 2013). However, no adjustment was made for
levels of life satisfaction at baseline, so it is impossible to be
certain whether processing speed or spatial ability were linked
with trajectory of life satisfaction or merely with its level at
follow-up. In a study using two waves of data from the Mid Life
in the United States survey (MIDUS), Rocke and Lachman (2008)
used cluster analysis to identify profiles of subjective change in
life satisfaction from past to future and investigated whether cog-
nition was associated with these profiles. Three different profiles
were identified based on participants’ perceived trajectories of life
satisfaction, but after adjustment for sociodemographic variables,
there was no difference in score on a composite measure of
cognitive function between participants in the three groups. Some
rather more persuasive evidence that poorer cognitive function
might have an adverse effect on well-being came from a study
where participants from MIDUS completed positive and negative
mood reports and a diary of stressors over eight consecutive days
(Stawski, Almeida, Lachman, & Tun, 2010). Participants with
better cognition tended to experience smaller decreases in positive
mood and smaller increases in negative mood after exposure to
stressors, suggesting that they may be more emotionally resilient in
the face of daily stress. In an investigation of change in depressive
symptoms before and after the onset of Alzheimer’s disease, scores
on a subset of items in the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression scale that asks about positive affect decreased before
and after diagnosis, but the change was very small (Wilson et al.,
2010) It has been suggested that cognitive decline might have a
greater adverse impact on eudaimonic aspects of well-being than
on the hedonic aspects of positive affect or life satisfaction (Wil-
son et al., 2013). Some evidence that this might be the case came
from a 5-year follow-up study where more rapid cognitive decline
was associated with greater decline in scores for several domains
of eudaimonic well-being, as measured by Ryff’s Scales of Psy-
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chological Wellbeing (Ryff, 1989), especially purpose in life (Wil-
son et al., 2013). Rate of decline of three of the four specific
cognitive domains assessed (episodic memory, semantic memory
and perceptual speed) was also associated with rate of decline in
purpose in life, and the association between rates of decline in
working memory and purpose in life was of borderline signifi-
cance (Wilson et al., 2013).
In the present study we used mixed-effects modeling of data
from four waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA) to investigate the within- and between-persons associa-
tions between positive well-being—assessed using a measure that
reflects both hedonic and eudaimonic domains—and cognition
based upon general cognitive function and markers of three dif-
ferent important domains of cognitive function—processing speed,
memory and executive function— in community-dwelling, non-
demented older people. In a previous analysis using this cohort, we
examined whether there was a bidirectional relationship between
depressive symptoms and general cognitive ability and found some
evidence that depression might influence cognitive decline, but
there was no indication of a reverse effect (Gale, Allerhand, &
Deary, 2012). No attempt was made in that study to distinguish
between the within-person and between-person effects of depres-
sion and cognition that could have led to incorrect inferences about
change and its determinants (Sliwinski, Hoffman, & Hofer, 2010)
and we did not examine the domains of cognition separately. In the
present study we aimed to build on our earlier work in this cohort
by exploring the within- and between-persons associations be-
tween positive well-being and cognitive function and investigating
whether any such associations were independent of depression.
Based on the evidence of previous work, we hypothesized that this
would be the case. In addition to depressive symptoms, we inves-
tigated whether physical health (Bond, Dickinson, Matthews, Jag-
ger, & Brayne, 2006; Pressman & Cohen, 2005), exercise
(Fratiglioni, Paillard- Borg, & Winblad, 2004; Netz, Wu, Becker,
& Tenenbaum, 2005), smoking (Nooyens, van Gelder, & Ver-
schuren, 2008), education (Anstey & Christensen, 2000; Dear,
Henderson, & Korten, 2002), household wealth or difficulties in
activities of daily living (Koster et al., 2005; Dear et al., 2002;
Rajan, Hebert, Scherr, Mendes de Leon, & Evans, 2012) moder-
ated any such associations. These factors have been associated




The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is an ongo-
ing longitudinal study of adults aged 50 and over (Marmot et al.,
2011). In total, 11,392 sample members took part in the first ELSA
follow-up in 2002–2003. There were further follow-up surveys of
the cohort in 2004–2005, 2006–2007, and 2008–2009. Everyone
was measured at roughly the same time at each follow-up (within
a year of each other), and were followed up at roughly the same
2-year intervals. In particular, for each participant at each wave,
cognition and well-being were assessed during the same interview
on the same day. The mean age at baseline was 65 years. People
entering the study ranged in age from 50 to over 90 years. The
variables we extracted from the ELSA data set are broadly divided
into time-varying measures of cognitive ability and positive well-
being taken at four waves of measurements, and time-invariant
observations of several covariates taken at or before the first wave.
We excluded cases who had reported by wave 1 that a doctor had
told them that they had Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease,
dementia, organic brain syndrome or serious memory impairment
(N 120), and those aged over 90 at wave 1 (N 93). After these
exclusions our analytical sample was based on 10,985 people.
Measurement of Cognitive Function
The ELSA data include scores on four tests of cognitive func-
tion: verbal fluency, immediate and delayed verbal memory, and
attention (Steel, Huppert, McWilliams, & Melzer, 2003). Verbal
(semantic) fluency was assessed by asking participants to name as
many animals as they could think of in 1 minute. Immediate and
delayed verbal memory was assessed using lists of nouns pre-
sented aurally. Attention was assessed using a letter cancellation
task. Scores on these tests were used as measures of three kinds of
cognitive function: the scores on the animal naming task were
taken as a measure of executive function, the sum of the scores on
the immediate and delayed recall tasks were taken as a measure of
memory, and the scores on the letter cancellation task were taken
as a measure of processing speed. The Pearson correlation between
the scores on the immediate and delayed recall tasks at each wave
were: 0.70, 0.70, 0.73, and 0.75. These three cognitive measures
were separately modeled to explore their different associations
with well-being, but they were also combined into a single mea-
sure to explore the association between general cognitive function
and well-being. The composite measure was derived as the score
on the first principal component. The standardized loadings of
executive function, memory, and processing speed were respec-
tively: 0.80, 0.80, and 0.69, and the first component explained 58%
of the variance. The distributions of these cognitive variables at
each wave had no significant skewness. Each variable was cen-
tered on the variable’s mean at wave 1 and scaled into units of its
standard deviation at wave 1.
Measurement of Positive Well-Being
The CASP-19 is a self-reported summative index consisting of
19 items designed to measure well-being (Wiggins, Netuveli,
Hyde, Higgs, & Blane, 2008). The items cover four theoretical
domains: control, autonomy, self-realization, and pleasure. In or-
der to obtain a measure of positive well-being from this scale, we
used the 13 items of the CASP-19 that are positively worded,
following the example of Huppert and Whittington (2003) who
created a measure of positive well-being from the positively
worded items of the General Health Questionnaire. These 13 items
assess both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being (Ryan
& Deci, 2001). Examples include: “I enjoy the things that I do,”
and “I feel that my life has meaning.” Cronbach’s alpha for the 13
items at each wave was respectively: 0.875, 0.882, 0.884, and
0.885. The positive well-being score was derived as the equally
weighted sum of the responses to these 13 items. Over 92% of all
respondents had no missing items, and over 97% had no more than
one missing item, which was judged acceptable to be ignored. The
response to each item was a 4-point Likert scale coded as 0 to 3,
so the aggregate of the 13 items was a score between 0 and 39. The
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direction of the scale was adjusted so that a higher score repre-
sented greater positive well-being. The scores at each wave were
scaled into units of the standard deviation at wave 1, and the mean
score at each wave was measured from the mean score at wave 1.
The overall distribution of positive well-being scores had mild
negative skewness. Transformations to eliminate skewness had no
substantial effect on the final estimates or their precision so these
data were not transformed.
Age
The study sample members were followed up for four waves of
measurement occasions at intervals of about 2 years. People en-
tering the study ranged in age from 50 to over 90 years. The mean
age at wave 1 was nearly 65 years with a standard deviation of
nearly 10 years, (see Table 1). Age was used as the time variable
in modeling. The age variable was centered on 70 years to reduce
collinearity between linear and quadratic terms in the models.
Covariates
We used eight covariates that we grouped into three kinds. The
first was depression. The second was demographic variables: sex,
age at finishing full-time education, and household wealth. The
third was health-related variables (besides depression): physical
health, smoking status, physical exercise, and difficulties in activ-
ities of daily living. Symptoms of depression were assessed at
waves 1–4 using an 8-item version of the Center for Epidemio-
logical Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D). This has an internal
consistency and factor structure that are comparable to longer
versions of the scale (Turvey, Wallace, & Herzog, 1999). We
derived a time-invariant depression score by summing the items at
each wave and taking each person’s average across the waves to
capture trait depression. A higher score represented greater depres-
sion. The data were log transformed to reduce the skew in the
sample’s data, because the majority of people did not have much
depressive symptomatology. Information on education and house-
Table 1
Characteristics of the Study Participants According to wave, (N  10985)
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
N 10985 8560 7345 6476
Age: mean (SD) 64.95 (9.99) 66.7 (9.66) 68.07 (9.47) 69.62 (9.08)
Range: min, max 50,90 52,92 54,94 56,95
Interval: mean (SD) 2.3 (0.46) 1.82 (0.44) 2.08 (0.42)
Depression: mean 1.60 1.54 1.51 1.47
Sex: count(%age)
female 0 6025 (54.8) 4741 (55.4) 4097 (55.8) 3649 (56.3)
male 1 4960 (45.2) 3819 (44.6) 3248 (44.2) 2827 (43.7)
Education: count(%age)
1 (least) 44 (0.4) 31 (0.4) 28 (0.4) 27 (0.4)
2 2551 (23.8) 1801 (21.5) 1460 (20.4) 1176 (18.6)
3 3671 (34.2) 2833 (33.9) 2405 (33.5) 2156 (34.1)
4 1922 (17.9) 1552 (18.6) 1347 (18.8) 1205 (19)
5 727 (6.8) 616 (7.4) 550 (7.7) 502 (7.9)
6 539 (5) 433 (5.2) 383 (5.3) 353 (5.6)
7 (most) 1282 (11.9) 1095 (13.1) 1001 (14) 911 (14.4)
Wealth: count(%age)
1 (least) 2087 (19.2) 1456 (17.2) 1188 (16.3) 996 (15.5)
2 2182 (20) 1658 (19.5) 1386 (19) 1183 (18.4)
3 2189 (20.1) 1731 (20.4) 1492 (20.5) 1290 (20.1)
4 2187 (20.1) 1798 (21.2) 1556 (21.4) 1407 (21.9)
5 (most) 2243 (20.6) 1844 (21.7) 1657 (22.8) 1541 (24)
Health: count(%age)
0 (fewest) 3227 (29.6) 2595 (30.6) 2287 (31.4) 2071 (32.2)
1 3575 (32.8) 2790 (32.8) 2392 (32.8) 2162 (33.6)
2 2328 (21.4) 1821 (21.4) 1551 (21.3) 1336 (20.8)
3 1034 (9.5) 764 (9) 656 (9) 536 (8.3)
4 453 (4.2) 332 (3.9) 267 (3.7) 227 (3.5)
5 181 (1.7) 121 (1.4) 84 (1.2) 62 (1)
6 70 (0.6) 55 (0.6) 45 (0.6) 27 (0.4)
7 17 (0.2) 12 (0.1) 7 (0.1) 6 (0.1)
8 (most) 8 (0.1) 4 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0)
Smoking: count(%age)
never smoked 1 3972 (36.2) 3130 (36.6) 2720 (37) 2457 (37.9)
don’t smoke now 2 5071 (46.2) 3964 (46.3) 3397 (46.2) 2971 (45.9)
smoke now 3 1942 (17.7) 1466 (17.1) 1228 (16.7) 1048 (16.2)
Physical activity: count(%age)
1 (least) 2730 (25.1) 1900 (22.3) 1538 (21) 1254 (19.5)
2 4256 (39.1) 3410 (40) 2932 (40.1) 2597 (40.3)
3 1241 (11.4) 992 (11.6) 874 (11.9) 794 (12.3)
4 (most) 2652 (24.4) 2214 (26) 1971 (26.9) 1799 (27.9)
Difficulties with activities of
daily living 2.76 2.55 2.47 2.31
309COGNITIVE FUNCTION AND POSITIVE WELL-BEING
hold wealth was collected at the initial interview. The wealth
measure, which has been identified as the most accurate indicator
of long-term socioeconomic circumstances in ELSA (Banks,
Karlsen, & Oldfield, 2003), includes savings and investments,
value of any property or business assets, net of debt, and excluding
pension assets. For this analysis we used data on quintiles of
wealth that were supplied with the data set. The education measure
was age at leaving full-time education, and this was grouped into
a 7-point scale in which the highest score represents the most
educated. The physical health measure was derived as the count of
the number of chronic physical health conditions. A simple un-
weighted count of the number of chronic health problems has been
shown to be almost as effective as complex severity-weighted
measures in predicting most outcomes, (Huntley, Johnson, Purdy,
Valderas, & Salisbury, 2012). During wave 1, participants were
asked whether a doctor had ever told them that they had any of the
following conditions: high blood pressure/hypertension, angina,
heart attack, congestive heart failure, diabetes or high blood sugar,
a stroke, chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis or rheumatism,
osteoporosis, or cancer. We added the number of chronic condi-
tions present to get a measure of physical health. The lowest score
corresponds with the most healthy, in the sense of having the
fewest chronic conditions. The physical exercise measure was
derived from three ELSA variables describing frequency of vig-
orous, moderate and mild exercise. Combinations of the response
to these variables were ranked according to the amount of exercise
involved, and the results grouped into quartiles to form a 4-point
scale representing increasing exercise: never or hardly ever; mild
exercise about once a week; moderate but fairly regular exercise,
such as a good walk; vigorous exercise fairly regularly. The
measure of difficulties with activities of daily living (ADL) was
derived from the participant’s response to a question asking
whether they had any difficulty doing a range of activities. We
created a score for difficulties in activities of daily living by
summing the number of difficulties reported.
The covariates were treated as time-invariant (having the same
value at each wave), either because the variable is intrinsically
constant within-person throughout the study (such as sex), or
because it was assumed to remain substantively constant. All
covariates except sex were centered on their mean and scaled for
unit standard deviation. (Sex was coded 0  female, 1  male).
The direction of the scale of each of the covariates is shown in
Table 1. To summarize, a higher score for each of the variables
respectively represents: greater depression, male, more years in
education, greater wealth, more chronic health problems, more
smoking, more physical exercise, and more difficulties with activ-
ities of daily living.
Missing Values
Cases with missing values were excluded only where there were
no measures at all on any of the variables of interest. No attempt
was made to impute missing values except for sensitivity analysis,
but rather we aim to show the missingness was ignorable under
maximum likelihood estimation. Table 1 shows the count of par-
ticipants at each wave, and shows the proportions of response
levels within covariates for the participants still in the study at each
wave. Despite falling numbers the proportions within each cova-
riate remain reasonably constant across the waves, indicating that
the sample remained reasonably similarly balanced on the covari-
ates. In other words nothing in the covariates indicated selective
dropout.
The effects of patterns of missing values in the outcome vari-
ables of cognitive function and positive well-being were tested
using the procedure described by Hedeker and Gibbons (1997).
We regressed the cognition and well-being outcome variables
separately onto dummy variables indicating observations belong-
ing to persons with particular patterns of missing values. Three
dummy variables represented patterns of monotone missingness:
dropout at the fourth, third, and second waves, and one dummy
variable indicated any of the four nonmonotone patterns of miss-
ingness found in the data. The dummy variables were coded so that
each coefficient was a mean outcome difference from the reference
category representing completers. They entered regression models
as main effects on the outcome intercept and as interactions with
time. Covariates were included in blocks to explore how missing-
ness effects were attenuated by covariate adjustment. About 39%
of the sample were persons with monotone dropout, and about 6%
had some nonmonotone missingness. There was no significant
difference in initial status or slope of cognition or well-being
because of nonmonotone missingness. In addition because there
were relatively few cases of nonmonotone missingness we judged
this to be ignorable. Persons who dropped out at some stage had a
lower mean score and steeper decline in both cognition and well-
being. The difference in mean score was greater for persons who
dropped out earlier, but this was attenuated by covariate adjust-
ment, primarily age and wealth. Persons who dropped out after
wave 1 were 0.29 SDs of cognition and 0.37 SDs of well-being
lower than the average completer. Those who dropped out after the
second or third wave were respectively 0.16 and 0.12 SDs of
cognition lower, and 0.12 and 0.02 SDs of well-being lower. There
were no significant differences in the slope of cognition or well-
being, or in the mean levels of well-being, because of monotone
missingness. However the difference in mean cognition was sig-
nificant (p  .004) for persons who dropped out for the last one or
two waves. Therefore we carried out a sensitivity analysis to
estimate variation and bias in the parameter estimates for models
of cognition using data imputed for missing values in the last two
waves. In a two-stage procedure we first estimated prediction
intervals for each missing value using individual growth curves
based on all available information from shrinkage estimates of
each person’s linear growth parameters. In the second stage we
created 20 data sets each with different imputed missing values by
randomly sampling with uniform probability within the prediction
intervals. The final full models were fitted to each of these data
sets and the variation in the resulting parameters was assessed. The
sign and significance of model parameters was the same across the
multiple data sets. Therefore we judged the occurrence of mono-
tone missingness to be ignorable when the covariates were in-
cluded in the model.
Models
Our overall aim was to explore the within- and between-person
associations between well-being and cognition, and how these
change with age, and with levels of depression, demographic
covariates, and other health-related covariates. We used two-level
mixed effects models instead of latent growth models for this
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application because disentangling within- and between-person ef-
fects is difficult with a latent growth model (e.g., Curran & Bauer,
2011), and it is straightforward to incorporate age as a continuous
time variable in a multilevel model, which suited the wide age
range of our data.
Several checks were carried out to assess whether the data met
the assumptions required for analysis of within- and between-
person associations: normality and homogeneity of within-person
sampling variability across age. Violations of the latter are known
to attenuate between-person effects (Ludtke et al., 2008). The
proportions of within- and between-person variability were as-
sessed using the intraclass correlation for each of the four time-
varying variables. Additionally, their within-person sampling vari-
ability was explored (cf. Salthouse, 2007). These results are given
in Table 2. Intraclass correlation was between 0 and 1, indicating
that outcome variation was not exclusively within-person or
between-person, but a mixture of these things. Within-person
variability was about half the magnitude of the variability in
between-person mean levels in standard deviations. There was
positive correlation between the mean level and within-person
variability for processing speed and executive function, but little
correlation for memory. Interestingly there was negative correla-
tion for well-being, indicating variability was smaller for people
with higher mean levels of well-being. Correlations between mean
levels and age were all negative, but correlations between within-
person variability and age were all small, indicating little system-
atic change in within-person sampling variability with age. Re-
gressing within-person standard deviation onto mean age indicated
the rate of linear change in variability was less than 0.003 standard
deviations per year for all time-varying variables.
Initially eight mixed-effects models were fitted: four models of
well-being each predicted by either the composite cognitive mea-
sure or one of the three time-varying measures of cognition, and
four models of cognition, one for each of the measures, each
predicted by the time-varying measure of well-being. All models
had random intercept and slope within persons that were allowed
to covary. The residuals were assessed graphically for normality
and judged to be acceptable. The models were then respecified
using group-mean centering (here person-mean centering, Hoff-
man & Stawski, 2009). Each time-varying independent variable
was replaced by two independent variables: a within-person cen-
tered (WP) variable and a person mean (PM) variable. The WP
variable entered as a time-varying (level-1) variable. The PM
variable was centered on its mean, and entered as a time-invariant
(level-2) variable in the equations for the random intercept (the PM
main effect), and the random slope of the WP variable, (the
WPPM interaction). The models were fitted by R function lmer
under REML (equivalent to SAS PROC MIXED or STATA xt-
mixed). The simple main effects of the WP and PM variables, and
the contextual effect of their difference (PM-WP), were tested
using R function glht from package multcomp (equivalent to SAS
ESTIMATE or STATA lincom). In all models the simple main
effects were positive and significant, the PM effect was larger than
the WP effect, and their difference was significant.
The eight models were each fitted in six stages so that a
predictor or block of predictors could be added at each stage to
assess its relative contribution. The models at the first stage were
baseline growth models with independent variables age (centered
on 70 years), and age squared. Subsequent stages added predictors
successively: first the WP variable, then the corresponding PM
variable, then the depression covariate, then a block of demo-
graphic covariates, and finally a block of health-related covariates.
The final full models included the main effects of age and age
squared, the main effects of WP and PM and their interactions with
each other and with age, the main effects of the covariates and their
interactions with the WP and PM variables. The models were
specified with random intercept, and slopes of age and WP, which
were allowed to covary.
Results
Analysis of the variance components of the eight models at each
stage is shown in Table 3 and Table 4. These results show how
much variation was uniquely accounted for by predictors included
progressively in six stages. Table 3 shows the proportional reduc-
tion in within-person residual variance and Table 4 the propor-
tional reduction in between-person intercept variance of each
model relative to the empty (intercept only) model (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003). In both tables the results of
the second stage model (B) show the additional effect of the
time-varying covariate with age controlled. In all models, the
additional contribution at each stage was significant (p  .01,
model comparison with the previous stage by likelihood ratio).
The results of Table 3 indicate that, although relatively little
within-person residual variance was explained by these models,
more well-being variation within-person was explained by cogni-
tion than cognitive variation within-person was explained by well-
being. Up to 7% of within-person variation in well-being was
explained by these models: about 4% by age but a further 2% to
3% by time-varying cognitive scores on all three cognitive mea-
sures. However, less than 1% of executive function and between
2.5% and 3% of within-person variation in memory and processing
speed was explained by these models. Of the variation explained
in memory most was accounted for by within-person variation in
well-being and very little by age. Of the variation explained in
processing speed most, about 2%, was accounted for by age
although 1% was because of within-person variation in well-being.
The results of Table 4 indicate that between-person differences
in mean levels on the covariates accounted for between 30% and
50% of intercept variation for cognitive and well-being outcomes.
Most variation in cognitive function between persons, between
20% and 30%, was explained by age. However a further signifi-
cant 5% to 10% was explained uniquely by mean levels of well-
Table 2
Intraclass Correlation and Indices of Within-Person
Sampling Variability
ICC M(SD)/SD(M) M.SD M.age S.age
Well-being 0.674 0.495 0.392 0.136 0.074
Executive function 0.605 0.585 0.121 0.404 0.066
Memory 0.611 0.605 0.041 0.501 0.031
Processing speed 0.588 0.533 0.281 0.385 0.031
Note. ICC intraclass correlation; M(SD)/SD(M) ratio of the average
within-person standard deviation to the standard deviation of the person
mean; M.SD  correlation between person mean and within-person stan-
dard deviation; M.age  correlation between person mean and age;
S.age  correlation between within-person standard deviation and age.
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being. Intercept variation in cognition was barely reduced by
accounting for depression, but the demographic covariates contrib-
uted 8%. Further contribution from health-related covariates was
negligible. Most variation in well-being between persons, between
30% and 40%, was explained by depression. Mean levels of
cognition contributed about 4% to well-being, with the greatest
from executive function and the least from processing speed. The
blocks of demographic and health covariates contributed about a
further 3% each.
In the following paragraphs we describe the results for the fixed
effects estimated for the final eight full models. The results for the
models of well-being are shown in Table 5 and the results for the
models of cognition are shown in Table 6.
The coefficients labeled age and age2 respectively show the
slope of the outcome trajectory for the average person at age 70
and the rate of change or curvature of that slope. The direction of
these effects indicates that well-being and cognition are both in
decline at age 70, and the rate of decline accelerates between ages
50 and 90 years. Model intercepts are not shown in the tables, but
the covariate main effects are shown and each represents the
difference in expected outcome level at age 70 because of indi-
vidual difference in the covariate between otherwise average peo-
ple. The direction of the significant covariate effects for people
with average mean levels of cognitive function at age 70 (in Table
5) indicates that higher levels of well-being would be expected for
people with lower levels of depression, who are female, with
greater wealth, less smoking, more physical exercise, and fewer
problems with daily activities. Likewise for people with average
mean levels of well-being at age 70 (see Table 6), higher levels of
cognitive function were associated with female sex, more educa-
tion, greater wealth, and more exercise. The main effect of sex, for
example, represents the expected change in outcome level between
women and men. The average man would have about 0.2 standard
deviations lower well-being at age 70 (see Table 5), and about 0.2
to 0.3 standard deviations lower cognition (see Table 6). However,
men had slightly higher scores than women on cognition measured
as executive function.
The results of main interest in Table 5 and Table 6 are the
association between the outcome and the focal predictor, repre-
sented by the WP and PM variables, and their interactions with
each other and with age and with covariates. The association
represented by the WP effect is the expected change from a
person’s usual (within-person average) outcome score on a testing
occasion when measurement of their focal predictor is one unit
higher than it usually is for them. This person is otherwise average
in the sense defined by zero on all covariates (thus aged 70,
female, and average on all other covariates including the mean
level of the focal predictor). The association represented by the PM
effect is the expected difference in outcome level between persons
whose mean level of the focal predictor differs by one unit, but
who are otherwise average people. Although most variation in
cognitive function was explained by age, and most variation in
well-being was explained by depression, small but significant
associations between cognition and well-being remained after vari-
ation in age and depression were controlled. In models where
cognition was the outcome the association was mainly because of
variation in mean levels of well-being between persons. In models
where well-being was the outcome the association was mainly
because of within-persons variation in cognitive function. Figure 1
shows sample average trajectories of age-related change in cogni-
tion and well-being, and how these were moderated by well-being
or by cognitive functioning, respectively.
The fixed effects estimated for full models where well-being
was the outcome are shown in Table 5. The results show a positive
and significant within-person effect of cognition, indicating that a
person who performed better than they usually did, on any of the
three cognitive tests, could also be expected to score higher on
well-being than they usually would. The cross-level interaction
between WP and PM was negative for executive function and
processing speed, indicating that for these measures the within-
Table 3
Percentage Reduction in Within-Person Residual Variance
Relative to the Empty Model
A B C D E F
Well-being on cognition 4.18 8.29 7.51 6.19 6.92 7.5
Well-being on executive function 4.18 5.89 5.54 3.96 4.58 5.36
Well-being on memory 4.18 6.54 6.07 4.50 4.91 5.53
Well-being on processing speed 4.18 7.84 7.45 5.77 6.63 6.96
Cognition on well-being 2.13 2.83 3.14 3.03 4.13 4.12
Executive function on well-being 0.43 0.39 0.14 0.22 1.02 0.96
Memory on well-being 0.06 1.52 1.75 1.84 2.48 2.43
Processing speed on well-being 2.06 3.01 3.10 3.09 2.97 2.98
Note. Model A is the baseline model with age and age2. Models B to F
successively include: the WP variable (B), the PM variable (C), depression
(D), demographic covariates (E), and health covariates (F).
Table 4
Percentage Reduction in Between-Person Intercept Variance Relative to the Empty Model
A B C D E F
Well-being on cognition 4.04 5.28 10.97 43.83 46.21 48.87
Well-being on executive function 4.04 3.52 7.62 42.06 45.25 48.04
Well-being on memory 4.04 3.78 7.84 42.21 44.99 47.50
Well-being on processing speed 4.04 5.05 8.11 43.21 46.23 48.61
Cognition on well-being 27.75 33.57 38.48 38.71 49.34 50.07
Executive function on well-being 21.80 28.55 32.34 33.04 40.34 40.41
Memory on well-being 28.55 36.06 40.06 40.45 51.45 51.74
Processing speed on well-being 17.89 22.17 25.22 25.19 32.11 32.91
Note. Model A is the baseline model with age and age2. Models B to F successively include: the WP variable
(B), the PM variable (C), depression (D), demographic covariates (E), and health covariates (F).
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person effect was stronger for people whose mean level of cogni-
tion was lower than others. For these measures the interaction
between WP and depression was positive, indicating the within-
person effect was stronger for people whose mean level of depres-
sion was higher than others. The PM effect of mean levels of
cognition upon well-being was positive and significant for exec-
utive function but nonsignificant for memory and processing
speed. However all three were positive and significant in models at
a previous stage that included depression but not the demographic
or health covariates (detailed results not shown), indicating that
between-person variation in well-being because of memory and
processing speed was accounted for by covariates. The interaction
between the PM effect of all cognitive measures and the physical
exercise covariate was negative and significant, indicating that the
between-person variation in well-being because of cognitive func-
tion was moderated primarily by exercise. The interaction between
WP and age indicated that the within-person associations did not
vary substantially with age (although the effect was borderline
(p  .04) for memory), but the between-person (PM) associations
interacted negatively with age, suggesting that difference between
people’s well-being that was because of difference in their mean
levels of cognition would become less with age.
The fixed effects estimated for full models where cognition was
the outcome are shown in Table 6. The association between
cognition and well-being was mainly because of variation in mean
levels of well-being between persons. Little within-person varia-
tion was explained by these models at any stage, indicating a
person who scored higher on well-being than usual for them on a
particular occasion would not necessarily be expected to perform
better than usual on a cognitive test. However, the effect of
between-persons (PM) variation in the mean level of well-being
was significant and positive for all cognitive outcomes at every
stage, indicating the variation in mean levels of well-being be-
tween persons was not accounted for by the demographic and
health covariates including depression. Thus women (for whom
sex was coded 0), aged 70 who were average on all other covari-
ates but who differ in their mean level of well-being would be
expected to differ in the same direction in their cognitive function.
The interaction between PM and sex was not significant, indicating
the effect of individual difference in mean levels of well-being
upon cognitive function was not significantly different for men.
However, the interaction between PM and depression and between
PM and physical exercise were both significant, suggesting these
variables were the most important moderating influences on the
association between cognition and positive well-being. The inter-
actions with depression and with exercise have the same sign, both
negative, but it is important to interpret each in conjunction with
the corresponding main effect, noting that the PM variable was
centered on its average. Exercise had a positive main effect indi-
cating its generally beneficial effect on the outcome. In this case
the negative interaction with well-being indicates that more exer-
cise makes the association between well-being and cognition di-
verge more positively from the average when well-being is below
average. We interpret this as indicating the benefits of exercise for
cognitive function are relatively greater for those with lower
well-being. Conversely, depression had a negative main effect
indicating its detrimental effect on the outcome. Here the negative
interaction makes the association diverge more negatively from the
Table 5
Fixed Effects in the Full Models of Well-Being
Outcome: Well-being Well-being Well-being Well-being
Focal
predictor: Cognition Executive function Memory Processing speed
Age 0.0103 (0.001) 0.0109 (0.0009) 0.0121 (0.0009) 0.0102 (0.0009)
Age^2 0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0005 (0.0001)
WP 0.0693 (0.013) 0.0458 (0.0105) 0.0339 (0.0101) 0.0447 (0.0124)
PM 20.0358 (0.0133)
WPPM 0.0323 (0.012) 0.0263 (0.008) 0.0214 (0.0081)
WPage 0.0029 (0.0012) 0.0019 (0.0009)
PMage 0.0047 (0.001) 0.0037 (0.001) 0.0045 (0.001) 0.0026 (0.001)
WPdepression 0.0399 (0.0112) 0.0171 (0.0087) 0.0278 (0.0098)
PMdepression 0.0267 (0.0095) 0.0309 (0.0099) 0.0321 (0.0101)
PMexercise 0.0249 (0.0093) 0.0309 (0.0095) 0.0196 (0.0099) 0.0206 (0.0102)
PMadl 0.0217 (0.0106) 0.0243 (0.0113)
Depression 0.4483 (0.0089) 0.4504 (0.0088) 0.4497 (0.0089) 0.4499 (0.0089)
Sex 0.2171 (0.0154) 0.2271 (0.0152) 0.2241 (0.0155) 0.214 (0.0155)
Education
Wealth 0.0866 (0.0085) 0.0846 (0.0085) 0.0888 (0.0086) 0.0902 (0.0085)
Smoking 0.0347 (0.0077) 0.034 (0.0076) 0.0346 (0.0077) 0.0336 (0.0076)
Health
Exercise 0.0617 (0.0084) 0.0621 (0.0083) 0.0633 (0.0085) 0.0595 (0.0082)
ADL 0.1125 (0.01) 0.1175 (0.0099) 0.118 (0.0099) 0.1114 (0.01)
Note. Estimates are in standard deviation units, with standard errors in brackets. WP is the effect of the average
person’s deviation from their own within-person average score on the focal predictor. PM is the effect of
individual difference in the person-mean of the focal predictor. Estimates labeled ab are interactions. Only
significant (p  .05) estimates are shown. Significance was based on standard errors. All WPcovariate and
PMcovariate interactions were included in the models, but interactions that were non-significant in any model
are not included in the table. The intercept is not included in the table. Models were fitted by R function lmer
under REML.
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average when well-being is above average. Therefore we interpret
this as indicating the adverse effect of depression is greater for
those with higher well-being. These interactions are illustrated in
Figure 2. However, depression had no significant effect on the
association when cognitive function was measured solely in terms
of processing speed. Neither the WP nor the PM effects interacted
significantly with age, suggesting the effect of mean levels of
well-being upon cognitive function did not change significantly
with age.
Discussion
In this large study of people aged 50 to 90 years, cognitive
function and positive well-being were assessed four times over a
6-year period. We used multilevel models with within-person
centering to model the within- and between-persons associations
between cognition and positive well-being, how these change with
age, and how they are moderated by levels of depression, demo-
graphic, and health-related covariates. Cognition and well-being in
the study sample were both in decline at age 70, and the rate of
decline accelerated between ages 50 and 90 years. Many studies
have shown that cognitive decline begins early, in the 50s or 60s
or even earlier. There have been few studies of the long-term
trajectory of well-being, but the evidence suggests that in later life
it tends to be relatively stable or to decline slightly (Charles,
Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Kurland et al., 2006), with a steeper
decline as death approaches (Mroczek & Spiro, 2005). We found
higher levels of well-being associated with lower levels of depres-
sion, female, greater wealth, less smoking, more physical exercise,
and fewer problems with daily activities. Higher levels of cogni-
tion were associated with female, more education, greater wealth,
and more exercise. We found that most of the variation in cogni-
tive function was explained by age, and most of the variation in
well-being was explained by depression. However, small but sig-
nificant associations between cognition and well-being remained
after variation in age and depression were controlled.
In models where cognition was the outcome the association was
mainly because of variation in mean levels of well-being between
persons: higher levels of average well-being were associated with
better cognitive function after differences in demographic and
health covariates, and in particular depression, were accounted for.
However the population averaged effect of variation within per-
sons was relatively insignificant. This suggests a person can be
expected to score higher on cognitive tests than a person with
similar cognitive function, if they generally have a higher level of
positive well-being; their gain would depend upon their mean level
of well-being rather than a transient higher mood state. This was
observed for three different kinds of cognitive test, which could
suggest the effect may be because of overall performance rather
than function in particular domains of cognition.
By contrast when well-being was the outcome of interest, the
association between cognition and well-being was almost entirely
because of within-person fluctuation in cognitive test performance,
suggesting that when a person’s cognitive function is better than
usual for them they will also feel greater well-being. The effect of
mean levels of well-being upon cognitive function did not change
significantly with age. But the effect of mean levels of cognition
Table 6
Fixed Effects in the Full Models of Cognition
Outcome: Cognition Executive function Memory Processing speed
Focal predictor: Well-being Well-being Well-being Well-being
Age 0.0371 (0.0009) 0.0242 (0.0009) 0.0335 (0.0009) 0.0274 (0.0009)
Age^2 0.001 (0.0001) 0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0009 (0.0001) 0.0005 (0.0001)
WP





PMdepression 0.0242 (0.0094) 0.0213 (0.01) 0.0243 (0.0091)
PMexercise 0.0303 (0.0099) 0.0301 (0.0105) 0.0212 (0.0094) 0.0285 (0.0101)
PMadl
Depression 0.0497 (0.0103) 0.0293 (0.011) 0.0611 (0.0099) 0.0279 (0.0106)
Sex 0.2221 (0.0157) 0.0558 (0.0166) 0.2354 (0.0149) 0.334 (0.0161)
Education 0.2221 (0.0084) 0.1916 (0.0088) 0.1898 (0.008) 0.0962 (0.0085)
Wealth 0.1017 (0.0087) 0.0884 (0.0092) 0.0977 (0.0083) 0.0393 (0.0089)
Smoking
Health
Exercise 0.0661 (0.0084) 0.0603 (0.0089) 0.0506 (0.008) 0.0358 (0.0086)
ADL
Note. Estimates are in standard deviation units, with standard errors in brackets. WP is the effect of the average
person’s deviation from their own within-person average score on the focal predictor. PM is the effect of
individual difference in the person-mean of the focal predictor. Estimates labeled ab are interactions. Only
significant (p  .05) estimates are shown. Significance was based on standard errors. All WPcovariate and
PMcovariate interactions were included in the models, but interactions that were non-significant in any model
are not included in the table. The intercept is not included in the table. Models were fitted by R function lmer
under REML.
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upon well-being did change with age, suggesting that difference
between people’s well-being because of difference in their mean
levels of cognition would become less with age.
We found some differential effects between the three domains
of cognitive function that were measured: executive function,
memory, and processing speed. The association of between-person
differences in average well-being with cognition was consistent in
all three domains of cognition examined. However depression had
no significant effect on this association when cognitive function
was measured solely in terms of processing speed. With well-being
and the other covariates controlled, women scored higher than men
when cognition was measured by memory and by processing
speed, but men scored higher than women for executive function.
In follow-up analyses we fitted a model including all three cogni-
tive variables as predictors and found that effects that were sig-
nificant when the cognitive variables were included individually
became attenuated but remained significant when all three cogni-
tive variables were included. The association of within-person
change in cognition with the well-being outcome was consistent in
all three domains of cognition. There was some association be-
cause of cognitive variation between persons, but only measured as
executive function. There was no difference between individuals in
general cognitive ability, and in particular when cognition was
measured as memory or as processing speed. Few previous studies
have examined whether change in or level of specific domains of
cognition is linked with later well-being. In the study by Wilson et
al. (2013), decline in episodic memory, semantic memory and
perceptual speed, as well as general cognitive ability, were all
associated with change in purpose in life, and baseline levels of
semantic memory, working memory and perceptual speed, and
general cognitive ability, were associated with later purpose in life.
Our finding that between-person change in executive function was
associated with well-being is consistent with the observation in
that study on the effect of change in executive functions on
purpose in life. Wilson et al. (2013) suggest that the impact of
cognitive decline on well-being may be primarily on those aspects
of eudaimonic well-being that require executive control skills,
such as purpose in life, because they involve intentions and regu-
lating behavior in accordance with those intentions. The measure
of well-being used in our study incorporated items on both eudai-
monic and hedonic aspects, although the former predominated. We
think it is the presence of eudaimonic items in our well-being scale
that explains our finding that well-being appeared to be influenced
by between-person change in executive function but not by change
in other cognitive domains or general cognitive ability. To our
knowledge, most previous longitudinal studies into the potential
influence of level of or change in cognition on well-being in olderFigure 1. Model-predicted trajectories of age-related change in cognition
and well-being. Note: The trajectories were predictions of the full models
(reported in Tables 5 and 6) with all other covariates held constant at their
respective means (equivalent to residualizing). The four panels show: A,
General cognition; B, Executive function; C, Memory; D, Processing
speed. Solid lines show trajectories of cognition with gray bands indicating
how this was moderated by a difference of one standard deviation in
person-mean well-being (the PM effects reported in Table 6). For example,
the vertical distance at age 70 from the solid line to the upper band in panel
A is 0.098 (see Table 6). Dashed lines show trajectories of well-being with
gray bands indicating a difference of one standard deviation in within-
person cognition (the WP effects reported in Table 5).
Figure 2. The effects of exercise and depression on the relationship
between cognition and well-being. Note: The graph shows the cognition
outcome for a range of person-mean well-being predicted using the fitted
model of cognition reported in Table 6. The scales are in standard deviation
units and person-mean well-being was mean-centered so 0 represents the
average. The solid line represents the predicted outcome with all other
independent variables held constant at their centered values. The dashed
lines represent the effect for persons with 1 standard deviation greater
exercise (upper dashed line) and depression (lower dashed line). The slope
of each dashed line is the slope of the solid line (0.0982) plus the respective
interaction effects (0.0303 and 0.0242, see Table 6). The intercept
differences between the solid and dashed lines are the respective main
effects (0.0661 and 0.0497, see Table 6).
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people have used measures of well-being based on hedonic aspects
alone, and their results have been negative. For example, in the
study by Gerstorf et al. referred to above (2007), no association
was found between change in perceptual speed and trajectory of
scores on the Philadelphia Center Geriatric Morale Scale. Simi-
larly, there was no indication that increases in cognitive limita-
tions, as measured by the Mini Mental State Examination, over a
54-month period influenced the trajectory of positive affect (Kur-
land et al., 2006). In the Lothian Birth Cohort, 1921 there was no
association between change in cognitive function between ages 11
and 79 and scores on Diener’s Satisfaction with Life scale (Gow et
al., 2005). One previous study used a newly developed measure of
well-being that consists of positively worded items on both hedo-
nic and eudaimonic well-being—the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental
Wellbeing Scale (Gale, Cooper, et al., 2012). In a meta-analysis of
estimates from four cohorts whose members had completed this
scale, no significant association was found between change in
cognition between age 11 and later life and well-being. Although
Wilson et al. (2013) found evidence that greater decline in cogni-
tion has an adverse effect on some eudaimonic aspects of well-
being, our findings in the current study suggest that any influences
of cognition on subsequent well-being occur primarily at the
individual level. It is possible of course that our ability to detect
between-person effects of cognition on well-being were hindered
by the relative stability of individual differences in well-being over
the short follow-up period of our study (Charles et al., 2001).
Exercise and depression were the most important moderating
influences on the association between cognition and positive well-
being. Our results suggest exercise has a beneficial effect upon
cognitive function that is relatively greater for those with lower
well-being. Differences in cognition would be expected to be less
influenced by differences in mean levels of well-being between
persons taking more exercise. In other words more exercise pro-
tects cognitive performance against the detrimental effects of
lower well-being. Indeed exercise could provide a kind of well-
being. This would be consistent with evidence from randomized
controlled trials in older people, which found that being more
physically active has a small beneficial effect on well-being (Netz
et al., 2005). The adverse effect of depression upon the cognition-
well-being association was greater for those with higher well-
being.
The strengths of the present study lie in its size, the fact that it
is representative of the community-dwelling English population
aged 50 and over (Taylor, Conway, Calderwood, & Lessof, 2003),
and the assessment of three different cognitive domains. A further
strength is the use of within-person centering to distinguish be-
tween the within-person and between-person effects of cognition
and well-being, which is necessary to avoid incorrect inferences
about change and its determinants (Sliwinski et al., 2010). Within-
group centering (here within-person centering Hoffman &
Stawski, 2009) provides a method for disaggregating these effects
that leads not only to greater precision but also to models that
explicitly account for both stable trait-like differences between
persons and transient state-like changes within persons. The study
has some limitations. First, there were only four waves of repeated
measures of each individual, with just 2 years between waves,
which may have hindered more accurate measurement of within-
person change. Second, there were no data on personality traits
such as neuroticism or extraversion. This prevented our testing
whether these factors confounded the links between cognition and
well-being (Gale, Cooper, et al., 2012).
In a previous analysis of data from this cohort, we examined
whether there was a bidirectional relationship between depressive
symptoms and cognitive ability (Gale, Allerhand, et al., 2012). We
found that greater depression was associated with a slightly faster
rate of cognitive decline but only in those aged 60 to 80 years.
There was no support for the hypothesis that there might be
reciprocal dynamic influences between cognitive ability and de-
pressive symptoms. In this earlier analysis we found no consistent
associations between physical health, smoking, exercise, social
class or education and the rate of change of cognitive decline. The
methods of analysis used in the present study were different from
those used in our earlier paper (Gale, Allerhand, et al., 2012).
There we found little evidence that any of the covariates influ-
enced the rate of cognitive decline. The present study provides
greater precision by disaggregating the within- and between-
persons effects of the focal predictor. We now find that the slope
of cognition at age 70 is in less decline (more positive) for greater
wealth and physical exercise and for less smoking. These findings
are consistent with observations in other cohorts (Fratiglioni et al.,
2004; Koster et al., 2005; Nooyens et al., 2008). We found no
evidence to link better physical health or better physical function,
as measured by number of difficulties with activities of daily
living, with the slope of cognition.
Few longitudinal studies have examined the potential influence
of well-being on subsequent cognitive performance. In one such
study, having a stronger sense of purpose in life—a facet of
eudaimonic well-being—was linked with a reduced risk of inci-
dent Alzheimer’s disease and mild cognitive impairment (Boyle,
Buchman, Barnes, & Bennett, 2010). Gerstorf et al. (2007) exam-
ined 13 years of data from the Berlin Ageing Study on well-being,
measured using the Philadelphia Geriatric Center Morale Scale
that assesses satisfaction with life, satisfaction with ageing and
lack of agitation, and perceptual speed. Using a latent change score
model they found a link between greater well-being and less
average decline in perceptual speed. We found a link between
greater average well-being and better performance in three cogni-
tive domains. However, the PM effects we found cannot directly
be compared with lagged dynamic change effects in a latent
change score model. There is some longitudinal evidence that
sense of perceived control—a facet of eudaimonic well-being—
may be predictive of later cognition. In one study, older people
with a stronger sense of perceived control had fewer difficulties in
performing cognitive tasks 20 years later (Caplan & Schooler,
2003). In another study of young, middle-aged and older adults,
Windsor and Anstey (2008) found that for each age group, there
were significant positive associations between between-person
variation in perceived control at baseline and subsequent perfor-
mance on tests of memory, verbal intelligence, and processing
speed, but within-person changes in perceived control were not
associated with changes in cognitive test performance over the
study period. This is consistent with the findings of the present
study where the within-person effects of well-being were nonsig-
nificant for all cognitive outcomes at every stage, whereas the
effect of between-person variation in the mean level of well-being
was significant and positive for all cognitive outcomes.
Our findings illustrate the value of distinguishing between
within-person and between-person effects in longitudinal models
316 ALLERHAND, GALE, AND DEARY
of change and suggest that although at a population level, greater
well-being may be linked with a reduced risk of cognitive decline,
this apparently protective relationship does not appear to hold at an
individual level.
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